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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first book of J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, the
philosopher’s stone was the sought after giver of eternal life, of
immortality, for anyone who possessed it. 1 Lord Voldemort needed it;
Harry Potter ultimately prevented him from getting it.
* Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland, Australia. The author
wishes to thank Peter Cane, Jules Coleman, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Grant Huscroft,
Richard Kay, Rande Kostal, Brian Leiter, Richard Posner, Maimon Schwarzschild, John
Smillie, and Steven Smith for their comments, suggestions, criticisms, and advice.
1. The title of the first Harry Potter book in Rowling’s native Britain was Harry
Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone. This title was changed by her publishers for the
North American audience to Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone. Since that first
book in the Harry Potter series, Ms. Rowling’s publishers have not been in a position to
insist on a different title for the U.S. market—for obvious reasons.
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In the rather less exciting world of legal academia, possessors of the
philosopher’s stone would measure their immortality not in terms of the
infinite or eternal but in far more prosaic terms—say, 50 or 100 years.
Any legal academic who writes a book or article that is still being widely
read in a century (or even half a century) can be thought of as having
achieved a sort of immortality.
And yet even in these vastly more circumscribed terms it is still an
exclusive club indeed. Confine yourself to the Anglo-American common
law world and who, today, could be said to possess the philosopher’s
stone? Holmes for sure 2 and Bentham as well. 3 After that it gets harder
and more debatable, though soon to join Holmes would assuredly be
Hart 4 and Fuller. 5 Dworkin may, or may not, stand the test of time. 6
It turns out, then, that the vast preponderance of legal articles and
legal books—and no doubt of all articles and all books—that are written
have a pretty short shelf half-life. Even where 50 or 100 years are as
good as immortality gets, very few writers will end up in possession of
the philosopher’s stone. And, to digress, one lesson we might all draw
from that humbling realization is that lots and lots of academics today
clearly take themselves too seriously.
Were one asked to nominate a shortlist of legal academics in their
prime today who might just beat the overwhelming odds and end up
possessing the philosopher’s stone, my view is that Jeremy Waldron
would have to be very high up on any such list. And what would
Waldron—50 or 100 years from now—be best known for? Surely it
would be for his strong defence of the elected legislature against the

2. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), is said to be
the most read legal article ever. Certainly it is still widely read today.
3. Jeremy Bentham wrote many, many works on law. The most read today may
be JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Metheun & Co. 1970) [hereinafter
BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION], or his attack on the French declaration of the
rights of man in JEREMY BENTHAM, RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE
UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Philip Schofield et al.
eds., 2002).
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) is considered by many to be
the best single book on legal philosophy ever. It, too, is still widely read today. See,
e.g., NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART (2004); Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking
Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852 (2006). It seems a safe bet to say this book will be widely
read even 100 years after its publication.
5. Lon Fuller might seem a more controversial pick. But if nothing else his The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949), will continue to be
read. And in the last few years Fuller has undergone something of a renaissance.
6. For a resoundingly negative assessment of Ronald Dworkin’s staying power,
see Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2005).
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pretensions and purported moral superiority of the unelected judiciary. 7
As Waldron himself notes, when writing in an overseas journal, “I am
known as a fanatical opponent of strong judicial review in the US
States.” 8
The gist of Waldron’s argument is this. He starts from a strong rights
perspective, one that does not see rights as ultimately resting on some
sort of consequentialist foundation. 9 From that strong rights starting
point—where rights are understood as goods in themselves and each
individual seen as an autonomous agent—Waldron reminds us that each
of us also has a right to participate in social decisionmaking. Indeed,
this right to participate stands as a sort of right of rights. And it exists in
the context of a world in which disagreement is a fact of social life—
disagreement that takes place between reasonable, well-meaning, smart,
even nice people and does so on questions over which the unelected
judiciary has no obviously greater moral perspicacity than anyone else.
In such circumstances, bills of rights, and the privileged position they
afford the judiciary, are highly suspect because they fail to take seriously
this right to participate in social decisionmaking; “decisions about rights
made by legislatures [ought not] to be second-guessed by courts.” 10 In
other words, Waldron has turned the strong rights-based arguments
grounded in autonomy and equality—arguments relied on by so many
bill of rights supporters—back on to those same people who defend the
unique role such instruments give to unelected judges.
So for Waldron we should all have a right to participate in social
decisionmaking, even as regards decisions about rights—how rights
ought to relate to one another, when they can justifiably be limited, what
is their proper scope and range, and more. This right to participate, this
Waldronian right of rights, should not be handed over to a small group
of unelected judges—to committees of ex-lawyers, as Waldron likes to

7. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006)
[hereinafter Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review]; Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based
Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993) [hereinafter
Waldron, Right-Based Critique].
8. Jeremy Waldron, Compared to What? Judicial Activism and New Zealand’s
Parliament, N.Z.L.J., Dec. 2005, at 441, 442.
9. For my distinction between strong rights foundations and weak rights
foundations, see James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s
Quandary, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 340–42 (1996).
10. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1360.
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say, who ironically resolve disputes among themselves by voting, by
majority rules, not on the basis of who crafts the most substantively
moral judgment or the one with the most references to Mill, Milton, or
one’s favoured human rights convention.
Of course that is a distortingly brief précis of an argument that
Waldron has elaborated upon in more than fifteen articles and two
books. 11 I trace it out here, however briefly, simply to indicate in
general terms the sort of strong anti-bill of rights or anti-judicial review
of primary legislation position for which Waldron is likely to be
remembered. It will be this, if anything, that seemingly will win
Waldron possession of the philosopher’s stone and legal academia’s
equivalent of immortality.
At this point I should lay my cards on the table and also admit that I
find Waldron’s anti-bill of rights writings overwhelmingly persuasive. 12
To the extent I differ from Waldron it is predominantly due to my
thinking that rights must ultimately be understood and justified in
consequentialist terms. I take a weak-rights perspective; Waldron seems
to take a strong-rights perspective. Yet on the whole issue of the proper
role of an unelected judiciary in a well-established democracy, I put
myself emphatically in the Waldronian camp. In the American context
at least and probably these days in the rest of the common law world
save for Australia, this sort of anti-bill of rights, pro-legislature, proWaldron perspective is clearly a minority viewpoint. Yet it is one to
which I more or less fully subscribe.
That needs to be made clear. It needs to be made clear because the
rest of this Article will take issue with recent claims Waldron has made
in the Harvard Law Review. 13 His recent claims are that unelected
American judges, in the process of deciding hard cases—even Bill of
Rights cases—“would be churlish and irrational to ignore the guidance
of whatever consensus has been reached among the nations on this

11. Waldron lists all of these himself. Id. at 1352–53 n.19.
12. Indeed, I have myself written against bills of rights and the exalted—I would
say illegitimate—place they accord the judiciary. See JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY AND
ANTIPATHY (2002); James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197
(2003); James Allan, An Unashamed Majoritarian, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 537 (2004);
Allan, supra note 9; James Allan, Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land, 30 FED. L.
REV. 561 (2002); James Allan, Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining
Judges in the Twenty-First Century, 17 K.C.L.R. 1 (2006); James Allan, Rights,
Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS (Grant Huscroft & Paul
Rishworth eds., 2002); James Allan, Paying for the Comfort of Dogma, 25 SYDNEY L.
REV. 63 (2003); James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again—Conceptions of Democracy, 25
LAW & PHIL. 533 (2006).
13. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (2005).
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point,” 14 or at least any reticence they might feel “does not preclude
turning to the legal consensus of civilized nations for assistance.” 15
In brief, in his Foreign Law paper Waldron lays out “a theory of the
citation of foreign law” 16 —an argument defending the appropriateness
of citing or deferring to the law of nations, at least sometimes, including
in controversial Bill of Rights cases before the Supreme Court on issues
such as “whether the Eighth Amendment forbids the juvenile death
penalty.” 17 Indeed, Waldron is explicit:
If these issues have been wrestled with in a number of other jurisdictions, then
our commitment to the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end
product of their labors for guidance. . . . [T]he accumulated legal wisdom of
mankind, embodied in ius gentium, may still have something to offer us. 18

I will argue that Waldron’s argument for citing foreign law is
unconvincing in the context of bills of rights and rests on a dubious
analogy. Worse, I will assert that Waldron’s underlying thesis in this
recent Foreign Law paper is at odds with the core of his own antijudicial review, anti-bill of rights position.
Of course Waldron’s Foreign Law paper is elegant, stylish,
exceedingly learned, and replete with erudition. What it is not, though,
is consistent with the body of Waldron’s own earlier works which he
himself describes as articulating a “fanatical [opposition to] strong
judicial review in the US . . . .” 19 Put differently, there appears to me to
be a lack of analytical consistency between what Waldron says in his
Foreign Law paper and what he says in those books and articles that
may one day give him philosopher’s stone immortality.
I will attempt to defend that claim in three steps. Step one involves a
rather detailed consideration of, and rejection of, an analogy that
Waldron explicitly puts at the very heart of the aforementioned claims
he makes in his Foreign Law paper—claims I put to one side until we
have considered the analogy itself.

14. Id. at 140.
15. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). Waldron does not tell the reader how one is to
determine which nations fall under the aegis of “civilized” and which do not, though
being democratic is presumably a key criterion.
16. Id. at 146.
17. Id. at 140.
18. Id.
19. See Waldron, supra note 8, at 442.
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II. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
ESTABLISHED BODY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS
Throughout this Foreign Law paper Waldron places great weight on
one particular analogy, an analogy to scientific problem solving:
I have invoked the image of science and of scientific problem-solving several
times to illustrate how a foreign law consensus may be relevant to U.S. legal
decisionmaking. 20
[A] consensus in either the law or the natural sciences can be wrong. In neither
field, however, is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to the
established body of findings to which others have contributed over the years. 21
It relies instead on the idea that solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law
might get established in the way that scientific theories are established. They do
not get established as infallible, they change over the years, and there are always
outliers who refuse to accept them—some cranky, some whose reluctance leads
eventually to progress. 22
[T]hat does not preclude turning to the legal consensus of civilized nations for
assistance anymore than the American origin of an epidemic precludes
Americans’ turning to foreign scientists for guidance. 23

And so on and so on repeatedly.
To begin this attack on that analogy, let us first consider alternative
medicine, then global warming and a few other examples before
returning to Waldron’s epidemic example. To what extent is it the case
that it is some sort of widespread consensus—or rather a consensus of
experts—that provides us with knowledge of and in the external, causal
world? And is there anything lying behind that consensus—some sort of
mind-independent, imposed reality—that is ultimately doing the work in
the scientific realm, something not obviously underlying or propping up
any legal consensus that may emerge when appealing to or citing foreign
law? Have Waldron’s polemical skills outpaced the demands of
accuracy and fairness, or at least led him to mischaracterize what was in
dispute, when he says:
Natural law jurisprudence never used to be a matter of individuals just inserting
their own moral judgments into legal reasoning, any more than natural science
was ever just a matter of idiosyncratic observations about energy or gravity. 24

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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A. Alternative Medicine
How would one assess the claims to respectability of the various sorts
of alternative medicine treatments on offer, from homeopathy, acupuncture,
and echinacea to aromatherapy, magnetic resonance zones, or anything
with the word holistic before it? A double-blind drug trial would seem
to be a good starting point, at least where the suggested remedy can be
given or not given with neither the patient nor doctor knowing if this is a
placebo or the proffered remedy. Indeed, this sort of double-blind test of
efficacy is the gold standard. No room is left for attributing causation
and differential outcomes to social expectations, individual psychology,
the placebo effect, or the observed fact that most people, for most
illnesses, simply get better on their own—whether they take nothing, a
sugar pill, or some unbelievably diluted addition to water.
Notice that nothing in this sort of double-blind trial is inconsistent
with “overlap, duplication, mutual elaboration, and the checking and
rechecking of results that is characteristic of true science.” 25 Indeed we
would expect such trials, and tests of efficacy generally, to make as
sophisticated a use as possible of statistics, meta-analysis, computer
modeling and attempts to control for more than one possible causal
agent, not to mention sorting out causation from correlation.
We can happily concede all that. And yet, when we come to pass
judgment on, say, the efficacy of echinacea or homeopathy, we need to
be very clear (in a way Waldron is not) just what it is we are “checking
and rechecking [our] results” 26 against. Is it against the opinions of all
the professors of the Harvard University Faculty of Medicine? Is some
consensus of their views (perhaps augmented by the views of medical
professors at the universities of Oxford, Toronto, and Melbourne), in and
of itself, determinative of whether homeopathy or chemotherapy or
antibiotics or echinacea can actually reverse the course of illnesses and
make people better?
If anyone be inclined to answer “yes” to this last query, stop and put
yourself in the shoes of the Dean of Medicine at Harvard University.
Against what does he or she assess effectiveness and check results? The
whole edifice of science rests on the premise that the answer here is not
just “the consensus of views of the other expert doctors.” Penicillin does
25.
26.

Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139.
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not save millions of lives just because a coterie of top doctors thinks it
does. Homeopathy and echinacea are not worthless, no better than sugar
pill idiocies, simply due to the fact that 99.9% of top medical experts
surveyed ticked the “worthless” box. Penicillin would not stop working
for no other reason than that the two—or five, or thirteen, or twenty-five
—most recently appointed medical professors at Harvard have now
decided it will.
The point is a simple one, but one left obscured by Waldron’s
analogy. Science rests on a belief that we all live in a material world;
that there is an external, causal world of which we are a part; that
Berkeley was wrong 27 and that Hume was right; 28 that there exists a
mind-independent world out there that imposes outcomes on all us
humans no matter how we may have been socialized or inculcated.
Penicillin works because of a mind-independent truth about the way the
world works and about the interactions of antibiotics with the human
body.
In that sense, while it is true that science is not “just a matter of
idiosyncratic observations about energy or gravity,” 29 it is equally true
that the whole scientific method and worldview—not to mention the
general enlightenment way of thinking—starts from precisely those
observations about our external, causal world. It is just those observations
that are the basis of ever more sophisticated attempts to draw
conclusions about how our world is structured and the cause and effect
laws that govern it—independently of whatever we, or even Harvard
professors, may happen to think.

27. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE 326–31 (Colin Murray Turbaybe ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1970) (1710).
Perhaps the correct term is not so much wrong as weird—thinking that the universe
would disappear if God did not keep looking at it does not, strictly speaking, have
implications for the scientific method or even, arguably, for the notion of causality. At
least I think it does not.
28. See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. SelbyBigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739). Hume began by conceding that we
could not prove, in a deductive way, the existence of an external, causal world. All of
our information comes from our senses. We have no direct contact with such a world. It
is logically possible that such a world does not exist, that Berkeley is right. But no one
believes that. We all naturally believe that such a mind-independent world exists. Any
modern day postmodernist English professor who purports to doubt it, or to adopt a
radical antifoundationalism, or to suggest all knowledge is, say, socially constructed,
needs only to be shown to his eighth floor office window and asked to jump. He will
not. As Hume argued, deep down the self-proclaimed radical skeptic too believes in a
mind-independent, external, causal world which imposes outcomes on all us humans
however we may have been socialised or inculcated or whether we be male or female,
rich or poor. Relatedly, see ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE
(Picador USA 1998), in particular chapter four.
29. Waldron, supra note 13, at 138.
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Seen in that way, the consensus of experts in a particular scientific
field still matters—but it matters in an indirect, evidential way because it
is such a strong indication of what is likely to be true in the external,
causal world. These people, who have spent their lives studying and testing
the complex causal interactions, have far more expertise than we do. If a
consensus of such experts in some scientific area is that X is the case,
then odds are overwhelming that X, in fact, is the case. Such experts are
not infallible of course. A seeming crank, every once in a while, will be
proved correct. But she will be proved correct because her views are
open to testing and potential falsifying and because, over time, the
evidence builds up on her side (as it did with the expanding universe
theory, say).
This is the only way to make sense of the claims to mind-independent
truth that science makes. It is the only nonmysterious, nonmystical way
to understand the presumptive force of any consensus of experts in the
realms of science. It is the only basis for labeling much of alternative
medicine as “rubbish.”
What Waldron nowhere provides in Foreign Law, and what I think
simply cannot be provided, is any reason for any of us to believe that
law 30 is analogous to science in so far as what it is that underlies and
supports a consensus of opinion in the two realms. More specifically,
when American judges are pondering “whether the Eighth Amendment
forbids the juvenile death penalty,” 31 and they look overseas and happen
to note a consensus of legal opinion amongst, say, western European and
Canadian judges on that question, Waldron’s analogy suggests that the
legal consensus of those overseas judges somehow sits atop a body of
mind-independent, imposed-on-humans truths, as it does in the scientific
realm.
If it were otherwise and the legal consensus of the European and
Canadian judges did not rest on any mind-independent, same-cause-

30. The same could be said, and of course has been said, of morality.
Noncognitivists or moral skeptics say just this—that when it comes to values and valuing
there are no mind-independent truths. Facts and values are distinct in just this way. And
oddly, Waldron is a self-proclaimed noncognitivist in the moral realm. See, e.g., Jeremy
Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 75, 75 & n.1 (1998). Of
course one could believe there are, in fact, mind-independent moral truths but not mindindependent legal truths.
31. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.
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inevitably-leading-to-same-effect type testable truths, 32 then there would
be at least some initial grounds for wondering why unelected American
judges interpreting a Constitution which is next to impossible to change
and whose decision in this area could not be overturned or reversed by
statute should be paying heed to that foreign law consensus. Or at any
rate, one might expect Jeremy Waldron—that strong advocate of a democratic
right to participate in social decisionmaking, even to participate in
decisions about the juvenile death penalty—to wonder this.
So we can see that this analogy, between a consensus in the natural
sciences and a consensus in the law, is being made to carry a great deal
of weight in Waldron’s Foreign Law paper. The more any such foreign
law consensus rests on moral sentiments (or, indeed, even on people’s
beliefs about some real, mind-independent moral truth where it is the
case that they have no agreed method for getting at such claimed moral
truths), 33 the less such a consensus in law resembles a consensus in the
natural sciences.
B. Global Warming and Other Examples
In the absence of the sort of empiricist worldview I have traced above,
it is not clear why anyone, anywhere, would care in the least that a
scientific consensus may be emerging as regards global warming (or
indeed be motivated to challenge its underpinnings and assumptions or
even know where to start in attempting to do so).
In other words, consensus in the natural sciences is ultimately governed
by—and open to being changed by—the imposed, mind-independent
realities of the external, causal world. Imagine yourself on the eve of
testing the first ever atomic bomb or watching the first ever attempt to
fly a fixed-wing airplane. Some experts in physics, in chemistry, in
advanced mathematics will think this atomic bomb will work. Other
experts will not. A consensus may even have crystallized around one
view or the other. But in no way will the answer to whether the bomb
32. However difficult and demanding of ingenuity and of familiarity with past
results such testing might need to be—indeed however much it might amount to far, far
more than mere “idiosyncratic observations.” Id. at 138.
33. This is the very point Waldron himself so effectively makes. See Jeremy
Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158, 173
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (“The point is that there is nothing equivalent in morals [to
scientific methodology], nothing that even begins to connect the idea of there being a
fact of the matter with the idea of there being some way to proceed when people
disagree.”). In brief, his point there is that even if there were real, mind-independent
moral truths, we humans not only disagree about what such truths might be, we also
disagree about how anyone should go about finding them. And of course, as a selfdeclared noncognitivist himself, Waldron sees moral evaluations in terms of sentiments,
not in terms of claimed true beliefs.
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works or not depend upon that consensus. No, any such consensus is
merely a good indication of how to wager if you are an educated layman.
The same is true as regards whether that fixed-wing airplane will fly or
not. The proof will be in the eating.
One could go on and on and on in the same vein. Take stem cell
research. Notice that the rights and wrongs of such research are
independent of whether the fruits of such research—research into how
the material world actually works and how to manipulate certain human
cells so as to produce treatments that may cure or alleviate paralysis or
Parkinson’s disease or other ailments—will be successful. The scientific
side of such research would ultimately be open to testing. It is the
myriad interlinked causal relationships that exist in the material world,
and the extent to which the researchers have understood those imposed
relationships, that will determine whether this stem cell research achieves
anything beneficial for human health.
By contrast, the rights and wrongs of such research do not look to be
open to any such test or testing—unless of course one is a utilitarian or
other consequentialist for whom the right thing to do is the thing that
delivers the most cumulative happiness or satisfaction. 34 Once that
absence of any imposed, mind-independent, empirical test is conceded,
one might fairly ask the following: What does any consensus that may
happen to develop around the rights and wrongs of such research
represent? Is it something more than the view of some number of other
people? If there be no underlying mind-independent truth that exists (or
at least that can be known by any agreed procedures), then why should
we pay heed to the consensus that has developed? Or, perhaps more to
the point of this Article, why should our unelected judges pay heed to
the consensus view of some group of overseas unelected judges, and
possibly lock us into that view, rather than paying heed to—or
leaving this issue of stem cell research to be decided by—our elected
representatives?

34. See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 12. In a sense,
utilitarians dissolve their oughts into ises, into questions about which actions are likely—
given all we know at present about the world—to deliver best consequences. For them,
moral rights and wrongs are a function of what does or does not happen in the external,
causal world. See James Allan, Internal and Engaged or External and Detached?, 12
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 5–14 (1999), reprinted in JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY AND
ANTIPATHY 3, 3–13 (2002). Such utilitarian/consequentialist views are minority ones
these days, though by no means insignificant.
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That last question ought to be an especially challenging one for
Jeremy Waldron.
C. Epidemics Originating in America and the Juvenile
Death Penalty
Waldron gives the specific example of an epidemic which originates
in the United States. That fact about its origins should not “preclude[]
Americans’ turning to foreign scientists for guidance,” 35 he says. I
wholeheartedly agree. One would be foolish not to consider and weigh
up—and of course go on to test—any widespread views of scientists
with knowledge of epidemics. Any such group’s view can be checked
and tested; the fact that such a group of scientists might be foreigners is
wholly irrelevant to whether their view proves able to withstand testing.
When we leave the realm of the natural sciences, though, and any
consensus of opinion there, and turn to some consensus of opinion in the
realm of law, we need to try to be quite specific about what we are
“checking and rechecking” that consensus of opinion against. 36 No
longer will it be the Dean of Medicine of Harvard University or of
Oxford University, some person or group whose opinion on the cause of
an epidemic and on methods to end it can be tested against the mindindependent, imposed realities of the external, causal world. Now it will
be the Chief Justice of the European Court of Human Rights, and the
consensus view of those judges on the juvenile death penalty. Or maybe
it will be the consensus view of the Canadian judges on gay marriage. 37
Or why not of the Irish judges on abortion 38 or the Turkish judges on
girls wearing headscarves to school? 39
In this legal realm we can ask the question we asked earlier of the
realm of the natural sciences: Is some consensus of the top judges’
views, in and of itself, determinative of whether that consensus is
correct? This time put yourself in the shoes of the Chief Justice rather
than the Dean of Medicine. Against what does the Chief Justice assess
35. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144.
36. Id. at 139.
37. See Halpern v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 177, 185–93;
Barbeau v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [2003] 12 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 33, 37–41.
38. See Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.); Soc’y for the Prot. of the
Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1997] I.R. 753, 757 (Ir.).
39. For a comprehensive discussion see The Secretary-General, Interim Report of
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Elimination of all
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, add. 1,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/280/Add.1 (Aug. 11, 2000). The
leading United Kingdom case on headscarves in schools is R v. Governors of Denbigh
High School, [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.).
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effectiveness and check results? Is it something other than “the
consensus of views of other expert judges?”
Now in one sense the answer to that last question will be an obvious
“yes.” Judges swear to do justice “according to law.” There are very
few areas of law these days into which statutes do not intrude and have a
decisive effect. In many areas, too, as in my mooted queries above, a
country’s constitution or bill of rights will be relevant. So it is not just
the first order moral opinion of the judge, or even the consensus moral
opinion of the preponderance of judges—though in some bill of rights
cases it can appear to come close to that. These opinions have to be
rechecked against the legislature’s statutes, the country’s constitution,
and the consensus opinions of that jurisdiction’s past judges. In law, any
consensus of judges’ opinions is always directed towards some law or
some constitutional provision. Their personal opinions are not determinative,
as though they could legislate on a blank slate (or certainly it is widely
hoped that this is not generally the case). 40
Yet this concession does not help sustain the plausibility of Waldron’s
analogy. In law, it may well be that not only the policy views, principle
judgments, and rights-based opinions of judges matter; it may generally
be that such views, judgments, and opinions of legislators and of
constitution-makers matter too. But there is nothing mind-independent
in any of that. When the Chief Justice “check[s] and recheck[s]” 41 her
results she is doing something qualitatively different to what the Dean of
Medicine is doing when he checks and rechecks his against the mindindependent realities of the external, causal world. What he checks his
results against “is characteristic of true science.” 42 What the Chief
Justice checks hers against is not. 43

40. Ronald Dworkin urges a theory of interpretation whereby his perfect,
superhuman judge Hercules makes the best fit he can of the first nine chapters, of all the
settled law (constitutional provisions, case law, statutes, and more) of a jurisdiction.
Hercules is not to decide hard cases by imposing his own first order moral or other
views. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–130 (1977).
41. Waldron, supra note 13, at 139.
42. Id.
43. Notice what Waldron says of the natural sciences: “On the analogy I have been
using, what characterizes a consensus in biology or epidemiology is not just that it is an
accumulation of authorities, but that it represents a dense network of checking and
rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and
building on one another’s work.” Id. at 145 (emphasis added). Yet it is precisely the
phrase I have here put in italics that finds no real equivalent in the realm of law.
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That is not to say that in law no good grounds may exist for ever
paying heed to the views of other experts, be they foreigners, elected
legislators, or unelected judges. It is simply to say that in my view
Waldron’s attempt to equate (or, perhaps less strongly, to analogize
between) the law of nations and the established body of scientific
findings fails. It is simply unpersuasive to claim that “solutions to
certain kinds of problems in the law might get established in the way
scientific theories are established.” 44
That means that Waldron’s attempt to harness for the realm of law the
same sense of solid, objective, timeless knowledge that exists (and for
good reason exists) in the realm of the natural sciences is not successful.
If American judges ought to cite and consider and weigh the consensus
of opinion of foreign judges, it cannot be because that consensus
represents what it does in the natural sciences, namely the currently
existing best understanding by us limited, biological humans of the
underlying, mind-independent reality of our external causal world. 45
The realm of law is not analogous to the realm of the natural sciences
in offering us humans that sort of indisputable knowledge; if it were,
then refusals to at least consider or cite or weigh or be guided by any
consensus that may have emerged in other “civilized nations” 46 would
appear to be perverse or xenophobic, if not downright irrational. But as
I have argued, that analogy is highly flawed. The law of nations—ius
gentium—may, as Waldron says, provide “the accumulated wisdom of
the world on rights and justice.” 47 Yet when he goes on to make the
comparison to the natural sciences, and to say that “[i]n both instances,
the goal was the accumulation of knowledge, not just the validation of
individual intuitions,” Waldron goes too far. 48 Whatever the goal may
have been, the type of knowledge produced is not analogous. 49

Credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building on one another’s work? Yes. Experimental
duplication? No.
44. Id. at 144.
45. Having said that, it is trite to say that current best understanding is not
infallible. On occasion outliers prove correct. But such outliers do not suggest theories
that involve discarding all the known laws of physics and more—they do not propose
what amount to miracles. See David Hume’s unsurpassed treatment of what would be
needed to believe in miracles in DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 109–31 (L.A. SelbyBigge & P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1975) (1777).
46. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144.
47. Id. at 138.
48. See id.
49. Likewise, the grounds for “expect[ing] our scientists to look only to findings
we had reason to trust” would differ from the grounds for restricting our legal inquiry “to
consensus among ‘civilized’ or ‘freedom-loving’ countries.” Id. at 145 (citing Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879)).
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At the risk of belaboring the point, consider this assertion: “Maybe we
should not give weight to courts in Zimbabwe or the Sudan. By analogy
we might not expect our public health officials to look to North Korea
for guidance in their response to a possible avian flu epidemic.” 50 Yet
dozens of countries around the world today—and no doubt a good many
nonstate organizations—do look for guidance to North Korea in the
realm of scientific know-how. True, it is in the subrealm of nuclear
weapons production and atomic bomb making, not avian flu prevention,
but the point remains. The “scientific spirit” 51 to which Waldron refers
does not depend on (indeed can be wholly divorced from) feelings of
revulsion, abhorrence of Darfuresque slaughter, or disgust at Mugabean
thuggery—all presumably factors in shying away from Zimbabwean and
Sudanese case law precedents. In science, however, it is ultimately what
works, what withstands duplication, what succeeds in harnessing the
external, causal world to one’s needs, that provides knowledge. So here
again the two sorts of consensus appear quite distinct.
Without recourse to that flawed science analogy, the case for appealing to
what Waldron describes as “the law of nations” for guidance is significantly
less straightforward. It may become dependent on a host of other
factors, not least the ease with which the elected branches can respond to
any decisions of the unelected judiciary that have been influenced by
this “accumulated legal wisdom of mankind.” 52 Whether it is the
elected legislators or the unelected judges that have been so guided in
their labors may matter too. In fact, one’s underlying view of the
relative role and competencies of the various branches of government,
including the deciding of questions of rights, may come into play once
the realm of law is seen as importantly unlike the realm of the natural
sciences.
III. SOME FURTHER DISTINCTIONS
Let us recall just precisely who it is who is here “present[ing] law . . .
as essentially a problem-solving enterprise” 53 as part of his self-declared
larger “aim . . . to present a theory of the citation of foreign law.” 54 This

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 146.
Id.
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is not one of the many, many writers who prefers judges to legislators—
at least when it comes to deciding rights-based cases—and who tends to
downplay reasonable disagreement in favor of moral certainties and
obfuscating abstractions. No, this is Professor Jeremy Waldron, the very
same person who has said all of the following, and much more of the
same, in the past:
[J]udicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of final
decisionmaking in a free and democratic society. 55
In the United States, it is indisputable both that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have a bearing on how [“abortion, affirmative action, the legitimacy of
government redistribution or interference in the marketplace, the rights of
criminal suspects, the precise meaning of religious toleration, minority cultural
rights, the regulation of speech and spending in electoral campaigns, and so
on”] 56 are to be resolved and that the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not
themselves determine a resolution of the issue in a way that is beyond reasonable
dispute. 57
These [anti-Bill of Rights] thoughts . . . are reinforced when we consider
how much room there is for honest and good faith disagreement among citizens
on the topic of rights. Things might be different if principles of right were selfevident or if there were a philosophical elite who could be trusted to work out
once and for all what rights we have and how they are to be balanced against
other considerations. . . . [T]he existence of good faith disagreement is undeniable.58
There is no guarantee that the procedures of a Supreme Court hearing will
secure a just outcome. . . .
....
. . . [A]lthough the justices support their votes with lengthy opinions drafted
by recent graduates of our law schools, the quality of a given opinion has no
impact whatever on the weight accorded to the vote it supports. Though justices
(like legislators) do attempt to influence one another, in the final analysis the
most eloquent jurisprudence counts the same in determining a decision as the
shabbiest piece of ill-tempered ideology. 59
No doubt, as I write, dozens of scholars and students are concocting ingenious
arguments to show that the U.S. Constitution requires this change [to recognize
homosexual marriage]. There is a sort of competition underway, and the
winner—the hero whose argument ultimately prevails in a Supreme Court
decision requiring states to recognize same-sex marriages—will receive the
same accolades as the heroes of Brown, Griswold, Roe, and all the other
landmark cases. But Posner thinks that for the moment such a strategy is futile
and irresponsible . . . .
....
I think Posner is right about all this. 60

55. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1348.
56. Id. at 1367.
57. Id. at 1368.
58. Waldron, Right-Based Critique, supra note 7, at 49.
59. Jeremy Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13 LAW & PHIL. 27,
29, 31 (1994).
60. Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597, 610–11 (2000)
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The moral philosopher pretends to offer some such apparatus—analogous
to the instruments or methodologies of science—an apparatus that will enable us
to bring our moral perceptions into line with each other and with “moral
reality.” But the offer is bogus. . . . For if one picks one’s philosopher carefully
enough, one can always find an analytical instrument to vindicate one’s most
cherished convictions . . . . 61
Posner is entitled to respond that judges (and other law-makers) don’t always
have the time or resources to make such fine discriminations among the
qualities and characters of those who offer them advice or send them amicus
briefs. For the judges, the question has to be: is the fact that someone is a wellknown philosopher a reason by itself for paying particular attention to his
opinions on a real-world legal issue. That is a question that has to be answered
wholesale, not retail, for the most part. 62
The requirement [in Bill of Rights cases] that judges give reasons for their
decisions could, in principle, be a vehicle for moral reasoning and for assuring
the public that moral issues are being decided on moral grounds. But, in fact, it
mostly isn’t; it is mostly a device for hiding the Court’s decisions behind a cloud
of technical jurisprudence. 63

The very same Jeremy Waldron who said all those things, and did so
in the context of disparaging Bill of Rights adjudication generally, now
wants to argue that the law of nations will sometimes be appropriate to
be referred to, indeed deferred to, including in controversial Bill of Rights
cases before the Supreme Court on issues such as “whether the Eighth
Amendment forbids the juvenile death penalty.” 64
Step two of my argument will attempt to draw a distinction between
judges considering (or being guided by or weighing or referring to or
whatever the degree of controlling force one prefers) some sort of
foreign law consensus in constitutional, Bill of Rights cases, on the one
hand, and considering it in all other cases, on the other.
However, let us start with an easier distinction to make, between
whether it is “ever appropriate for American courts to cite or defer to
foreign law” 65 and whether it is ever appropriate for elected legislators
to do so. When it comes to democratically elected legislators, or indeed
elected members of the executive branch, all of Waldron’s arguments in

(citations omitted).
61. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
63. Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89, 105
(2002).
64. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.
65. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).

149

ALLAN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

4/22/2008 1:30:03 PM

favour of at least considering “the law of nations” 66 or “ius gentium” 67
or “the accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and justice” 68 or “a
consensus in . . . the law” 69 or however you want to put it, seem wholly
uncontroversial. So if some group of elected representatives of the
people come to the conclusion that there are serious problems with the
way tort law operates in the field of, say, personal injuries—that it is an
inefficient way to compensate the injured because too big a slice of the
compensation dollar currently goes to lawyers and insurers and the
running of courts, that it unduly distorts behaviour by overencouraging
risk aversion, and that who is affected rests almost entirely on raw
luck—then why should not such legislators look to New Zealand’s no
fault personal injury scheme 70 or Canada’s, Australia’s, and the United
Kingdom’s procedural rules that shift well over half of a defendant’s
legal costs on to the plaintiff when a lawsuit is unsuccessful. 71 Other
legal regimes can be considered, weighed, referred to, used to guide
changes, or even completely and utterly deferred to. On what basis could
anyone possibly object?
Remember, if the reforms that have been modeled on New Zealand’s
legal regime in this area, or the United Kingdom’s, prove ultimately to
be unpopular or unsuccessful then they can be altered again or even
changed back. We are mooting legislative reforms after all. Whatever
amount of guidance, direction, or instruction may have flowed from
some overseas consensus, it will ultimately be the elected lawmakers
here who will enact such changes, who will be held accountable by the
voters for them, and who can always amend or appeal them using the
exact same legislative procedural tools.
Relatedly, when it comes to elected legislators referring to, indeed
deferring to, foreign law models, there is simply no need at all to justify
this copying on the basis of some purported analogy to the natural
sciences—some hint or suggestion that New Zealand’s no fault tort
system happens to rest on a timeless, objective, mind-independent body
of indisputable knowledge that is the product of testing, experimental
duplication, possible falsification, and that got “established in the way
that scientific theories are established.” 72 No, even where a majority of

66. Id. at 132.
67. Id. at 134.
68. Id. at 138.
69. Id. at 139.
70. As indeed Waldron himself suggests in Jeremy Waldron, Moments of
Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 389
& n.1 (David Owen ed., 1995).
71. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 3132, pt. 44 (U.K.).
72. Waldron, supra note 13, at 144.
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elected legislators are motivated to imitate or copy some foreign legal
initiative on nothing much more than “individual intuitions,” 73 that is
appropriate.
Therefore, in contesting Waldron’s claims about the role of any
foreign law consensus we need to be extremely clear about whether it is
the judges or legislators who are being guided (or seeking guidance) in
their labors. This initial distinction is crucial, as next to no one—and
certainly not I—would contest the legitimacy of legislators being so
influenced.
Alas, Professor Waldron himself is not always as transparent about
this distinction as we might have wished. 74 Consider this passage:
Another way of putting the matter is this: We may have simply decided, as a
matter of national will, not to rule out the death penalty altogether. But a case
can still be made that we should not just decide whether it is cruel or unjust to
execute adults for crimes committed when they were children. Since it is an
open question in our system whether this practice is constitutional, we should
look not just for a decision but for a way of figuring out the complex rights and
wrongs of the matter, as well as the vexing issues of culpability and responsibility.
In addressing this problem, we need all the help we can get. If these issues have
been wrestled with in a number of other jurisdictions, then our commitment to
the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end product of their labors
for guidance. So even if the modern death penalty is quintessentially and
peculiarly American, the accumulated legal wisdom of mankind, embodied in
ius gentium, may still have something to offer us. 75

I have put all the first person plural pronouns, save the first one, in
italics. In the context of Waldron’s Foreign Law paper it is clear that all
these italicized pronouns refer to the unelected judiciary, not to all the
voters who have a Waldronian right to participate in social decisionmaking
(through their elected representatives), even about whether to execute
adults for murders committed when children. Each “we” and “our” and
“us” who will be struggling with “whether the Eighth Amendment forbids
the juvenile death penalty” 76 refers to a judicial “we” or to a judicial
“us.” 77 Waldron’s use of a deceptively embracing pronoun obscures that
fact; it goes some way towards blurring the distinction—the elected

73. Id. at 138.
74. Though he does say “the law of nations is available to lawmakers and
judges . . . .” Id. at 133.
75. Id. at 140 (first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth emphases added).
76. Id.
77. See id. at 139, 140–41, 143–47 (employing similar usages of the first person
plural pronoun, for example, “of course it is ultimately our decision . . . .”).
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legislator as opposed to unelected judge distinction—that I think absolutely
needs to be made when considering the issue of the appropriateness of
referring or deferring to foreign law.
With that distinction made we can now turn back to another
distinction I believe needs to be made—between judges deciding Bill of
Rights cases 78 and judges deciding non-Bill of Rights cases. The key
difference here is the ease with which the elected branches of
government can respond to any decisions of the unelected judiciary that
have been shaped or directed by what Waldron sometimes calls the
“accumulated legal wisdom of mankind.” 79
Unelected American judges interpreting a Bill of Rights that is
entrenched in a Constitution which is next to impossible to change
effectively have the last word on such issues. Their view on whether to
pay heed to some foreign law consensus cannot be reversed or overturned
by statute; the elected legislators cannot gainsay them.
In all other areas of law where judges might wish to look to some
foreign law consensus this is not the case. American judges who refer
to, and perhaps even defer to, how Canadian and Irish courts—or even to
how a more grandiose law of nations or consensus of civilized states—
happen to treat litigants’ claims for damages arising from unlawful
arrest, can be met with a legislative response. The Alien Tort Statute 80
that the judges have interpreted in the light of this consensus can be
amended or repealed by Congress—assuming, as I do for the moment,
that there are no Bill of Rights or other Constitutional issues raised.
True, it can be difficult in a practical sense for an elected legislature to
respond to every single court decision, not least because there is only so
much political capital to draw upon while so many issues are seen (by
some) to warrant legislative action. And it is true, too, that the
seemingly simple power of statutory interpretation—without any overt
recourse to constitutional interpretation—should never be underestimated.
Nevertheless, I think this distinction between Bill of Rights cases and
other cases is a worthwhile one all the same. Only as regards the latter is
the elected legislature left with (admittedly varying) room to put forward
its view and ultimately prevail. As we have seen, almost no one objects
to legislators having scope to pay heed to some perceived consensus of
78. Here, I use the label “Bill of Rights cases” to encompass not simply U.S.-style
entrenched bills of rights cases and U.K.-style statutory bills of rights cases but also
other constitutional cases, including federal separation of powers cases. My strong
hunch, however, is that it will be in the realm of rights-based cases that judges are most
inclined to look abroad.
79. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The Alien Tort Statute was first enacted in 1789.
See Waldron, supra note 13, at 131.

152

ALLAN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 45: 133, 2008]

4/22/2008 1:30:03 PM

Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

civilized states. Where those same legislators are left in a reasonable
position to respond to and countermand some use the judges have made
of such a perceived consensus, the objections to it must surely be less
powerful than when the legislators can do nothing and are impotent.
Or rather, that is a position and a distinction which seems to me to be
one incumbent upon all Waldronians to take and to make—including
Jeremy Waldron himself. It should be comparatively easier for them and
him to allow a role for the citation of foreign law in “private law, for
example, compared to constitutional law.” 81
Those not inclined to accept Waldron’s anti-Bill of Rights, antijudicial review arguments, of course, are in no such position. Rights-based
decisionmaking by unelected judges 82 does not overly concern them.
Some even revel in it. For them, whatever theory they may devise as
regards the appropriateness of citing foreign law, it will not be one
where a right to participate in social decisionmaking—a Waldronian
right of rights—is a crucial, fundamental consideration.
Accordingly, the need to distinguish between unelected judges being
guided by a foreign law consensus in Bill of Rights cases, as opposed to
this happening in all other cases, is one I am here only attributing to
Waldronians.83 For them though it is a second important distinction to make.
That said, Waldron himself attempts to finesse this second distinction,
or at least that is what one might infer from a segment of the lengthy
passage I cited above, namely the following:

81. Waldron, supra note 13, at 129. That said, any role for overseas case law
citation in the private law sphere could not, in my view, be founded on the analogy to
science. Furthermore, the fact Waldronians would find it easier to resort to the practice
of overseas case law citation in the private law sphere as opposed to the Bill of Rights
sphere does not entail that they would actually choose to do so. As I note below, there
are practical and procedural difficulties with any such practice—difficulties that may
lead some Waldronians to forswear such citation even in the private law sphere.
82. Even decisions that amount to having the last word on where to draw a host of
social policy lines when it comes to “abortion, affirmative action, the legitimacy of
government redistribution or interference in the marketplace, the rights of criminal
suspects, the precise meaning of religious toleration, minority cultural rights, the
regulation of speech and spending in electoral campaigns” and much else too, including
on the issue of the juvenile death penalty. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review,
supra note 7, at 1367.
83. Non-Waldronians need not make this distinction. Nevertheless, non-Waldronians
may still, on other grounds including the practical and procedural ones I mention below,
decide not to cite, refer to, or defer to foreign law in any sort of case.
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Since it is an open question in our system whether this practice [of possibly
executing adults for crimes committed when they were children] is constitutional
. . . we need all the help we can get. . . . [And] the accumulated legal wisdom of
mankind . . . may still have something to offer us. 84

The suggestion there is that judges deciding even Bill of Rights cases
may have more room—more legitimate room—to decide difficult social
policy issues when these are “open question[s] in our system.” 85
Yet from the perspective of someone who thinks “disagreements about
rights [ought to be settled] using . . . legislative institutions,” 86 what does
it matter that judges happen to get to an issue first? If it be politically
illegitimate for judges to gainsay what the elected legislature has already
decided about rights—for all the powerful reasons Waldron himself
advances and that offer him future possession of the philosopher’s
stone—then how, precisely, does it become somehow legitimate simply
by virtue of it being an unsettled area of law which happens to come
before the courts before it reaches the legislature? There is no
immediately plausible answer to those questions that I can see.
Worse than that, this “open question” metaphor is misleading.
Legislatures either regulate or they do not regulate. Yet there are no
obvious grounds for treating the latter course as not having dealt with a
situation, as opposed to having made a decision to leave it alone. 87
Waldron’s distinction here rests on a temporal factor—between the
illegitimacy of later in time second-guessing by judges and the (at least
sometimes) legitimacy and acceptability of earlier in time decisionmaking
by judges—that is far from obviously determinative or even important.
Even worse than that, the effect of the judges opting to decide these
open questions in the context of Bill of Rights disputes is just as
antidemocratic—in Waldron’s terms—as in the case of non-open or
settled questions. Remember, when the judges do happen to get to an
issue first, and they then make a decision under the aegis of the
constitutionalized Bill of Rights, the elected legislature is foreclosed
from overruling the judges and from deciding this particular issue.
Hence, my view is that this apparent attempt to finesse the distinction
between judges deciding Bill of Rights cases as opposed to other sorts of
cases fails. When it comes to the unelected judiciary being guided by
some foreign law consensus it matters which sort of case we are

84. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140. For the passage at length, see supra text
accompanying note 75.
85. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140. For the passage at length, see supra text
accompanying note 75.
86. Waldron, Case Against Judicial Review, supra note 7, at 1360.
87. Thanks to Richard Kay for this point.
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considering—or at least it matters, or should matter, to all of us who are
Waldronian democrats.
IV. DO NOT FORGET THE DISAGREEMENT AND DISSENSUS
The third step in my argument will be an altogether smaller one.
Indeed it will be a quintessentially Waldronian one. It is simply this: We
must not forget the fact that smart, reasonable, well-intentioned, even
nice people simply disagree about how rights ought to play out, how
they should relate to one another, when other considerations outweigh
them, and even what falls under their aegis.
In his Foreign Law paper Waldron says that “Ronald Dworkin has
made Riggs [v. Palmer] the leitmotif of an entire jurisprudence, arguing
that law comprises deep legal principles as well as rules embodied in
texts and precedents.” 88 In a similar spirit it would not be unfair to say
that Waldron himself has made this emphasis on dissensus and
disagreement—reasonable disagreement amongst reasonable people
where there is no agreed or uncontentious procedures or methods for
resolving that disagreement—the leitmotif of his critique of bills of
rights and his discussions of rights. It lies at the heart of his defence of
“letting the numbers count” representative democracy and of his
opposition to “strong judicial review in the US States.” 89 It undergirds
his powerful defence of the elected legislature against the pretensions
and purported moral superiority of the elected judiciary. In no small
way, it may one day help him to possess the philosopher’s stone.
How odd, then, to find Waldron asserting that “[t]he real contrast
between those who oppose and those who defend the use of foreign law
in American legal reasoning is not that jurists in the first group are
parochial and the second cosmopolitan. It is rather this contrast between
law as will and law as reason.” 90
Yet in the context of Bill of Rights cases of the sort I distinguished in
step two above, why should Waldron expect opposition to his defence of
the use of foreign law only to come from those who see law as will? If
88. Waldron, supra note 13, at 136 (footnote omitted).
89. Waldron, supra note 8, at 442; see James Allan & Andrew Geddis, Waldron
and Opposing Judicial Review—Except, Sort of, in New Zealand, N.Z.L.J., Apr. 2006, at
94, 94–96 (discussing my and Andrew Geddis’s response to Waldron’s pessimism
regarding New Zealand’s legislative mechanisms).
90. Waldron, supra note 13, at 146. A page earlier Waldron says: “I do not expect
any of this to convince those who see law as purely a matter of will.” Id. at 145.
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we happen to live in a world in which people (who, for the sake of
argument, all accept “law as reason” in some similar way to Waldron)
disagree about what reason demands when it comes to rights and
morality, and who see no substantive, appeal-to-reason-itself way to
resolve those disagreements, then resolution of those disagreements will
ultimately be on the basis of some set of procedures—such as letting the
numbers count either amongst all voters or amongst the top judges only.
Even more to the point, the disagreements between those smart, wellintentioned people will not stop being reasonable disagreements because
one side can point to a consensus of overseas judges who agree with
them. 91 That would only be so if overseas judges, or some consensus of
them, were able or likely to find or discover correct substantive answers
to these rights-based issues—or rather, if the fact they claimed to be able
to do so, in and of itself, could convince those who disagreed.
However, that is plainly not the case.
Hence, in Bill of Rights cases, where a decision of the unelected
judiciary effectively locks the rest of us out of having any input—where
our right to participate, the right of rights in Waldron’s eyes, is taken
away—opposition to “the use of foreign law in American legal
reasoning” 92 can be based on procedural grounds. Not all opponents of
such usage will be “those who see law as purely a matter of will.” 93
Where, as Waldron himself argues, 94 all resolutions of rights-based
disputes will ultimately be on a procedural basis, not on a substantive
basis (such as who writes the most morally wonderful opinion with the
most references to John Stuart Mill), what is so attractive about this
particular procedure of resolving disputes by referring to, or deferring to,
foreign law?
To start, there are no hard and fast rules governing the use of overseas
precedents. Indeed, there are no rules at all. Nothing like the notion of
stare decisis exists to help in choosing between the myriad overseas
precedents on offer—nothing to guide the judges in determining when
overseas decisions should be cited, which decisions should be cited,
what weight particular decisions should be accorded, and so on. 95

91. In the vast preponderance of instances it would be far more accurate to
describe this “consensus of overseas judges” in terms that recognize it is a majority of
such judges in a majority of cases.
92. Id. at 146.
93. Id. at 145.
94. See, e.g., Waldron, Right-Based Critique, supra note 7, at 39–41.
95. For an extensive discussion on American courts, see James Allan & Grant
Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in
American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006). For a full discussion of this point
from the perspective of a sitting judge, see Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have
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Next, there is some evidence from overseas to suggest that the citation
of overseas authority in rights-based litigation leads to a gradual ratchetup effect, that on average, over time, this practice results in judges
extending and broadening the ambit of various rights and the scope and
range of their application. 96
In a different vein, there is a problem with comparative size or relative
populations. The main common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have a combined population of just
over a third of America’s. These are likely to be some of the jurisdictions
most often cited. Yet even were one a diehard internationalist, it is not
obvious why a consensus of Canadian, British, Australian, and New
Zealand judges’ views should count for any more than the views of
Texan, Georgian, Floridian, or even Californian judges.
Understood as a procedure for resolving reasonable disagreements
over rights issues, this method of appealing to foreign law even raises a
danger Waldron himself moots, “the prospect that a judge will invoke
this theory opportunistically, picking and choosing the consensus he
relies on, to reinforce conclusions that he wanted to reach anyway.” 97
And, of course, one can be aware of that danger even while resoundingly
rejecting the notion that law is “purely a matter of will.” 98 In fact, I see
no reason why such a danger might not be seen as of crucial (perhaps
determinative) significance or moment when it comes to assessing
appeals to foreign law as a procedure for resolving disagreement, rather
than as a science-like method for delivering solid, objective, timeless,
mind-independent knowledge.
Waldron himself alludes to the procedural shortcomings of deciding
cases based on the views of moral philosophers, a procedure not unrelated
to this foreign law one. Recall, from above, what he says about that:

Our Own Laws: The Court Should Never View a Foreign Legal Decision as a Precedent
in Any Way, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 40.
96. See James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, The Citation of Overseas
Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11
OTAGO L. REV. 433, 441–42 (2007). In a study of reported New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act cases at the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal levels from enactment in 1990 to
April, 2006, in which reference was made to overseas precedents in interpreting the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right at issue appears to be extended in some way or other
in 40% of all such cases. It is extended four times more often than it is given an
interpretation narrower than it had before the court’s decision. See id. app. H at 458–67.
97. Waldron, supra note 13, at 146.
98. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
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Posner is entitled to respond that judges (and other law-makers) don’t always
have the time or resources to make such fine discriminations among the
qualities and characters of those who offer them advice or send them amicus
briefs. For judges, the question has to be: is the fact that someone is a wellknown philosopher a reason by itself for paying particular attention to his
opinions on a real-world legal issue. That is a question that has to be answered
wholesale, not retail, for the most part. 99
The moral philosopher pretends to offer some such apparatus—analogous to the
instruments or methodologies of science—an apparatus that will enable us to
bring our moral perceptions into line with each other and with “moral reality.”
But the offer is bogus. . . . For if one picks one’s philosopher carefully enough,
one can always find an analytical instrument to vindicate one’s most cherished
convictions . . . . 100

Moreover, those who do share concerns about referring to, or deferring
to, foreign law as a procedure for resolving rights-based disagreements
are unlikely to be reassured by the surprisingly candid comments of the
President of the American Civil Liberties Union.
In the ACLU’s ideal world, all individual rights would receive the maximum
protection consistent with civil libertarian principles, and, in support of our
claims for each right, we would cite whatever source of legal authority offered
the most protection—not only the US Constitution, but also, alternatively, state
constitutions, federal or state statutes, or international human rights principles.
This is an upward-ratcheting approach. In other words, the US Constitution—as
interpreted by the Supreme Court—sets a floor under our individual rights, but
it should not set a ceiling over them.
Under this civil libertarian approach, to the extent that increased protection for
individual rights is offered by other binding legal authorities, domestic or
international, they should prevail over US constitutional law. In contrast,
though, whenever these other authorities purport to undermine rights protected
by the US Constitution, the Constitution trumps them. In the same vein, we
believe that government officials should respect fundamental rights even if they
are not expressly articulated in any constitution, treaty, or any other explicit
source of law. 101

Such comments completely ignore the obvious Waldronian rejoinder
that people disagree about how rights ought to play out, and about what
is their “maximum protection consistent with civil libertarian principles.”102
Note, as well, that the preceding arguments in this section have been
made on the supposition that the distinction between “law as reason” and

99. Waldron, supra note 60, at 623 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
note 62.
100. Waldron, supra note 60, at 618 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
note 61.
101. Nadine Strossen, Liberty and Equality: Complementary, Not Competing,
Constitutional Commitments, in L ITIGATING R IGHTS , supra note 12, at 149, 153
(footnotes omitted).
102. Id.
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“law as will” has not been overdrawn by Waldron, though truth be told I
am not wholly convinced that that is in fact the case. 103
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have taken issue with recent claims made by Jeremy
Waldron in the Harvard Law Review, claims defending the use of
foreign law in American legal reasoning. I have argued that in the
context of Bill of Rights cases, where the elected legislature is shut out
from responding to the decisions of the unelected judges, the appeal to
overseas precedents is not an obviously attractive procedure for resolving
rights-based disagreements. Or rather, I have argued that this is the case
for Waldronians, for those who broadly accept Jeremy Waldron’s defence
of the elected legislature and his general anti-bills of rights position. 104
My argument has been that Waldron’s underlying thesis in his
Foreign Law paper is at odds with the core of his own anti-judicial
review, anti-bill of rights position. My response involved a detailed
attempt to refute Waldron’s analogy between the law of nations and the
established body of scientific findings. Waldron himself explicitly rests
much, if not all, of the force of his defence of appeals to foreign law on
just this analogy. Having asked “what reasons there are for taking this
[defence of the use of foreign law] line of thought seriously,” 105
Waldron spends over three pages “set[ting] out this analogy in full.” 106
If my attack on that analogy was successful, and one finds recourse to
the analogy flawed and unpersuasive, the case for appealing to the law
of nations for guidance does not disappear with it. For legislators, the
case for such appeals remains immensely strong. Relatedly, where the
elected legislature is in a position to respond to judicial decisions
invoking foreign law, there may possibly also be a case for it. It is in
Bill of Rights cases, where the elected legislature is left with no room to
103. First off, the bare concept of reason lacks substantive content. Nor is there any
knock-out grounds for preferring, say, a Kantian conception of reason to a Humean one.
And assuming one can get over those hurdles, it seems likely that on any conception of
reason the work it will do in resolving cases will run out, even for courts. See Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 70–72 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2001) (presenting another writer
with doubts about this distinction).
104. Again, this is not to imply that all non-Waldronians will or should find such
use of foreign law attractive.
105. Waldron, supra note 13, at 143.
106. Id.
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respond to the judges, that the case for appealing to the law of nations
clearly seems to fail. More exactly, it seems to fail from the vantage of a
Waldronian democrat.
That leaves two further matters to be raised. Firstly, I have deliberately
skirted around the entire issue of how a Waldronian judge ought to
decide Bill of Rights cases. That further issue is clearly, if indirectly,
relevant to the issues I have been discussing. However, it is also a
complex and tricky issue, one that deserves a separate paper on its
own—one I have attempted elsewhere. 107 Here, let me just comment on
what to me seems the most that follows if one chooses to consider this
issue solely from the judge’s perspective, and in particular from the
perspective of a Waldronian judge who believes that the whole task of
gainsaying an elected legislature is at core illegitimate. From that
vantage it may ultimately be that having accepted the job as a judge one
has to do something when confronted with a case involving abstract
rights. Indeed, it may well be that such a Waldronian judge is at times
sorely tempted, psychologically, to seek guidance or illumination—or at
least the comfort of having his or her views confirmed by others. Were
that Waldronian judge in those instances to prefer seeking guidance from
the musings of other judges around the world rather than in the writings
of philosophers like Dworkin, some observers—including me, perhaps—
might find themselves reluctantly resigned to the practice. Of course
that is a world away from actively encouraging and justifying the
practice in the way Waldron has done in his Foreign Law paper.
The second further matter involves the ancillary question of whether
Waldron has changed his mind as regards any of his earlier positions.
This seems unlikely to me. 108 More likely, in my view, is that Waldron
strongly disapproves of the juvenile death penalty, thinking it plainly

107. See James Allan, The Travails of Justice Waldron, in EXPOUNDING THE
CONSTITUTION (Grant Huscroft ed., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with the
author).
108. This is simply an empirical claim by me, of course. It is distinct from the issue
of whether Waldron, in light of the views he expresses in his Foreign Law paper, should
now go back and reconsider some of his earlier positions, up to and including his
insistence that the content of rights ought to be committed to the elected legislators. In
fact, questions raised by this Foreign Law paper might include: Does an emphasis on
dissensus and disagreement as regards rights make sense outside of a utilitarian/
consequentialist approach? Does recourse to the “wisdom of the world” regarding rights
implicitly presuppose a natural law/natural rights understanding of nonlegal rights? Is a
position of the sort that says, “[A]ssuming, for the sake of argument, that there are
objective moral truths, including truths about rights (which makes them strong rights), it
nevertheless is the case that strong judicial review is inappropriate because of the fact of
the right to participate and reasonable disagreement”—ultimately an unstable position?
Does Waldron, or does Waldron not, now think there is a fact-of-the-matter in connection
with questions about rights?
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“unjust to execute adults for crimes committed when they were children.”109
And appeals to “whatever consensus has been reached among the nations
on this point” would happen to support his substantive moral opinion on
this matter. 110
It would also, as it happens, be a useful tool in overruling the many
Americans who disagree as regards the justice of executing adults for
crimes committed when they were children. It would be a handy way to
subvert their right to participate. I say this as an opponent of capital
punishment myself. 111
The anti-Bill of Rights Waldron who punctures the pretensions and
purported moral superiority of the unelected judiciary—of both the
American and non-American varieties, and who emphasizes the fact
that dissensus and disagreement on virtually all rights questions is to
be expected, with no side easily characterized as evil, stupid, or
uninformed—that Waldron lays out a demanding moral path. My
understanding has always been that on that Waldronian moral path,
when I find that a majority of my fellow citizens disagrees with me in
their moral judgments, even as regards the juvenile death penalty, the
remedy is not to urge unelected judges to impose my view on the
legislature and on all those fellow citizens who disagree with me, even if
that urging be indirect and wrapped up in an appeal to the law of nations.
The Waldronian remedy is for me to spend a few Saturdays a month
campaigning for politicians and political parties who share my view, to
write newspaper columns urging a change, to participate in the
democratic process in an effort to change opinions.
If Waldron is hinting in his Foreign Law paper that the juvenile death
penalty issue is somehow idiosyncratically distinct from other rightsbased issues, and that disagreement here is in fact unreasonable, then he
should tell us why that is. He should lay out his grounds for thinking
this issue, exceptionally, can be resolved on a substantive rather than
procedural basis. He should avoid erecting an erudite and learned
edifice that, at the end of the day, and whatever else it may do, makes
less demanding the path of convincing one’s fellow citizens to revise
their rights-based moral views.

109. Waldron, supra note 13, at 140.
110. Id.
111. On consequentialist grounds and with this caveat—I remain of an open mind
as regards the question of executing mass-murdering terrorists.
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For Jeremy Waldron, the philosopher’s stone does not lie down that
path.
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